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Miller begins by identifying "affectional
communities," which are just those paradigmatic
communities to which I referred, communities in the
lexical sense, communities par excellence. Then he
tells us that the biotic community is too large and
varied to be an affectional community. Therefore,
since, following Hume, I ground morality in feeling
or affection, upon my preferred moral theory the
biotic community is beyond the moral pale.

Harlan Miller has correctly identified the key
concept of my proposed umbrella moral theory for
animal liberation and environmental ethics - the
"community concept," as Aldo Leopold called it in
"The Land Ethic" of A Sand County Almanac. And
Miller is right to point out that "community," as it
appears in my argument, it not a univocal term. As I
move from family and tribe and Midgley's mixed
community to the global village and the biotic
community, I shift from the conventional or lexical
meaning of "community" to some other non
standard sense. But the word "community," at least
as it appears in the paper of mine here under
discussion, is not, therefore, simply ambiguous - its
various senses united only by etymology - nor may
my argument be summarily dismissed as a case of the
fallacy of amphiboly. As I have elsewhere pointed
out, the ecological concept of a biotic community is
analogical. In ecology, the organization of living
nature has been fruitfully compared to paradigmatic
communities - communities in the literal sense of
the term. In Charles Elton's classical formulation,
the analogical character of the concept of a "biotic
community" is very evident. Elton sometimes spoke,
for example, of plants and animals occupying
"professions" in the "economy of nature." The
critical question, then, is this: Are biotic
communities similar to paradigmatic communities in
moraUy relevant ways? I think that they are and,
curiously, so does Miller - despite what he says
toward the beginning of his commentary on my
paper.
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Had Miller left it at that, I would have had to say
here that human moral sentiments, though a legacy
of our evolutionary heritage, are underdetermined.
Although they evolved through "kin selection" and
originally extended only to family and clan
conspecifics, they are plastic and may be molded by
cultural information. They may be, and in fact have
been, stretched to encompass first the people over
the hill and across the river, then those beyond the
mountains and the seas, and, by now, among
enlightened folk, they encompass all 5 billion Homo
sapiens. We are all, as our most enlightened moralists
tell us, "brothers and sisters under the skin." What
counts as a small, cozy kinship group depends on
your frame of reference. For cave-persons it was a
band of 50 or so people and half as many dogs. Later
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members of the community." I don't "just" accept the
assertion that follows "that" in Miller's sentence. In
fact, without further qualification I don't acc.ept it at
all. I have been at pains to point out in a variety of
venues (including the paper under discussion), that
the land ethic is only one ethical accretion among
many, each correlative to our nested community
involvements, and, further, that the obligations
correlative to the inner, more intimate communities
preempt those correlative to the outer, less intimate
ones. Other things being equal, obligations to family
members come before obligations to anonymous
human beings, and obligations to human beings,
individually, come before our duties to the
environment. So, when we are talking about the
interests of the human members of the biotic
community, I certainly do not accept the assertion
that they are subordinate to its integrity, stability,
and beauty.

it was the city-state; later still, the nation-state.
Since the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions
our spatial and temporal horizons have been
considerably expanded and with them our
perception of the limits of our affectional (moral)
"community." The Earth is a "small planet" in a vast
galaxy in a still vaster universe. All its contemporary
denizens are coevolved and possibly descended from
a single cell. The biotic community, from this point
of view, looks like a congeries of tribes, descended
from a common ancestor, living symbiotically on an
island paradise in the midst of a hostile and desert
ocean. In an astronomical and geological frame of
reference the biotic community seems familial and
its members our sisters, brothers, cousins, uncles,
aunts, grandfathers, and grandmothers - as
American Indians sometimes, in fact, characterize
them.
But Miller, in effect, says all of this for me. He
writes: "That altruism emerged within limited groups
[affectional communities] is almost certainly true.
But that is no reason to argue that altruism should
remain confined to such groups." I never argued it,
although Garrett Hardin has in his paper,
"Discriminating Altruism." Miller goes on: "Thus
universal principles [ethics, as he explains] have
their origins in sympathy and affectional community,
but far outrun those origins as we (both individual
and societies) grow. Our hearts can not encompass
the world, but our heads can see that what the heart
cares for extends beyond the limits of the heart's
vision." My point exacdy! I just wish that I could so
facilely turn out such poetic phrases. Hence, so far as
my central argument is concerned, I find myself not
replying to Miller but quoting him to support my
contention. (As to the implications of this forensic
irony for the self-consistency of Miller's commentary,
I leave the reader to judge for him- or herself.)

Let me hasten to say, having emphatically
registered this qualification, that in purely
environmental cases our obligations are primarily to
the community as a whole, and where conflicts
arise, the integrity, stab iIi ty, and beauty of the
biotic community preempt environmental ethical
duties that we may owe to individual biotic
community members (when those members are not
family members, fellow human beings, or members
of the mixed community). The land ethic, sui
generis, is, in other words, holistic.
I accept this assertion, but I don't just accept it,
nor is it "undefended." I derive it from the structure
of the biotic community. It is therefore defended.
But I cannot fully defend it here because, of course,
that would involve opening a whole 'nother can of
worms. (Actually several cans, beginning with the
is/ought dichotomy and naturalistic fallacy and
ending with the metaphysical implications of
ecology.) "Animal Liberation and Environmental
Ethics: Back Together Again" will appear in a book
of my collected essays called In Defense of the Land
Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy which will
be published by the State University of New York
Press in 1989. I cannot altogether fault Harlan
Miller for thinking that the moral priority of the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community has gone undefended, because I have so
far only managed to defend it in scattered essays
which Miller may not have run across in his
reading. When these' essays are published as a
collection then Miller and other critics of the land
ethic will have less of an excuse for this particular
0
permutation of the argumentum ad ignorantum.

Miller and I do have one central point of
disagreement. In his view, the ethical principles
generated by our moral sentiments should remain
the same in each stratum of our community
involvements. I think the different relationships
within our various communities generate different
proximate moral principles in each case - family,
and extended family, national, mixed, international,
and biotic communities.
Finally, I would like to dispute an allegation
which Miller directs to me personally. He says that I
"just accept the undefended assertion that the
beauty, integrity, and stability of the biotic
community are morally prior to the interests of the
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